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Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses how Malaysia manages the impossible trinity, the conjecture 
that a country cannot simultaneously maintain an open capital account, an 
exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence. Only two out of these 
three goals can be mutually consistent and policy makers have to decide which 
third goal to give up. The paper shows how Malaysia adopts an intermediate 
regime -- a regime that enables policy makers to manage all the three goals 
simultaneously. The impact of the global financial crisis on the Malaysian 
economy and the policy options for Malaysia to deal with the recent huge capital 
outflows are discussed in this paper. The willingness by Bank Negara Malaysia to 
allow a certain extent of exchange rate adjustments in the face of current global 
crisis reflects that Malaysia is not exempted from the impossible trinity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In any open economy, policy makers are confronted with a trilemma, which is 
known as the “Impossible Trinity”, demonstrated by Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell in 
the sixties during the times of fixed exchange rate regime.  This paper examines how 
Malaysia manages this impossible trinity. The question of why an intermediate solution 
to this trilemma could work in Malaysia is analyzed in this paper.   
 
Section 2 of this paper begins with a general discussion of the “Impossible Trinity” and 
its relevance to Malaysia.   This is followed by Section 3 which describes the institutional 
structure of the exchange rate management, monetary policy and financial liberalization 
regimes in Malaysia. Section 4 explains two key channels through which the recent 
global financial crisis is transmitted to Malaysia, namely, the trade channel and the 
finance channel which led to a fall in the country’s income. Section 5 examines what are 
the policy options available for Malaysia to handle such volume of capital outflows when 
the choice of objectives relative to the impossible trinity is not clear. Section 6 concludes 
this paper.  
 
 
2. Impossible Trinity 
 
 
The impossible trinity stipulates that economic policy makers are faced with a 
macroeconomic trilemma, that is, exchange rate stability, free capital mobility and 
monetary policy independence. This theorem asserts that under any macroeconomic 
circumstances, only two out of these three goals can be mutually consistent and policy 
makers have to decide which third goal to give up.  The intuition is when a country has 
an open capital account and the exchange rate is pegped to some base currency, simple 
interest rate parity will pin down the domestic interest rate, forcing it to be equal to the 
interest rate of the base currency, if not, capital will flow until they do (Obstfeld et al., 
2004).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the policy trilemma for open economies. The corners of the triangle 
show the policy goals just described. Any pair of goals is achievable but requires the third 
goal to be abandoned (Joshi, 2003). Specifically:  
 
(i) Exchange rate stability and free capital mobility can be combined by adopting a 
permanently fixed exchange rate but has to surrender monetary independence.  
 
(ii) Monetary independence and free capital mobility can be combined 
by adopting a floating exchange rate but has to surrender exchange rate stability. 
 
(iii) Exchange rate stability and monetary independence can be combined but 
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has to surrender capital mobility. In other words, combine a fixed exchange rate and 
domestic monetary independence at the cost of a closed capital account.  
 
 
                                               Figure 1:  Impossible Trinity 
                                             
 
Fixed Exchange rate  
Open capital account  Monetary Policy independence  
 
 
 
 
This theorem sounds fairly straightforward. Policy makers are required to choose two out 
of the three favourable goals shown above. However, in reality, such simplification does 
not happen all the time. Some countries make unambiguous choices among these three 
objectives. For example, Hong Kong desires to achieve exchange rate stability and 
simultaneously a free capital mobility, has kept its currency fixed and given up monetary 
autonomy altogether. On the other hand, Japan uses monetary policy to affect its 
domestic economy, and at the same time, keep its capital market open, but had to let its 
currency float freely (Hannoun, 2007).  But there are also some countries that manage all 
the three goals which cannot be simultaneously achieved (Obstfeld et al.(a), 2004). Some 
emerging market economies which have pursued capital account liberalization, manage 
the exchange rate movement, while concurrently retaining autonomy in the conduct of 
the monetary policy.  
 
The impossible trinity asserts that only free floating and fixed exchange rates are 
sustainable regimes with increasing capital mobility.  Intermediate exchange rate 
regimes, including adjustable pegs, crawling pegs, crawling bands and even a managed 
floating exchange rate are not sustainable and should be abandoned. This is described as 
the “two corners solution” or the “bipolar view” or the “hollowing out of the middle” 
(Eichengreen,1994).   
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However, some economists think that the bipolar view is unsound and that intermediate 
xchange rate regimes are often more appropriate than the bipolar view for many 
 
ies can 
-
iate 
t 
nd 
. Malaysia – Economic Overview and Institution
e
countries. Frankel (1999) commented that the impossible trinity has artificially restricted
the menu of choice between fixed and floating exchange rates. In practice, authorit
opt for intermediate exchange rate regimes even with perfect capital mobility. Frankel 
wrote, “What then is the origin of the hypothesis of the disappearing intermediate regime 
(the “missing middle?”)? …….this is not the same thing as saying one cannot have half
stability and half independence. There is nothing in existing theory that prevents a 
country from pursuing a managed float ……..”(p.5, 1999).  Frankel (1999) named this 
sort of selection as “intermediate regime” . In Hannoun’s (2007) words, an intermed
regime is a regime that is somewhere between the clear cut choices relative to the 
trilemma.  Hannoun wrote, “an intermediate solution has a certain appeal, i.e. there migh
be some kind of optimal weighting among the three objectives” (p.3, 2007). India a
Malaysia are good examples of these intermediate regimes.  
 
 
 
3  
nge rate and monetary policy in 
alaysia 
Malaysia is a small open economy. It has a relative open trade sector and capital 
ccount. Liberalization of the trade account came before the liberalization of the capital 
accoun s 
ective 
is 
 
re, 
ed 
 
  
3.1 An overview of the financial liberalization, excha
M
 
 
a
t (Yusof, 1994). The total trade to GDP has increased from 89 percent in the 1970
to 230 per cent in 2008. Unlike other developing countries, liberalization of the capital 
account in Malaysia has been gradual and cautious. Prior to the onset of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, it has significant capital market liberalization. Capital controls were 
imposed selectively and temporarily in 1993-1994 and in 1998-2001. While the obj
of the capital control in 1993-1994 was to slow down the inflow of short-term capital 
during good times, the 1998 controls were introduced to limit capital outflows of capital 
during the Asian currency crisis period (BNM,1999).  During the Asian Currency Cris
of 1997, Malaysia’s policy turnaround was to give up free capital mobility with a view to
maintain a fixed exchange rate while using monetary expansion to stimulate domestic 
economy. Of course, the capital control policy created a controversy but it was 
recognized as a respectable option for the government to want an effective policy 
instrument to prevent further financial turbulence (Athkorula, 2001). Furthermo
Malaysia’s capital account controls targeted only short-term capital flows and it us
these controls for the shortest possible time (BNM,1999). 
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There were several exchange rate regimes in Malaysia since its independence in 1957.  
fter obtaining independence in 1957, the Ringgit had been pegged to the Pound 
e 
5,  
.  
as 
 
ut 
ned 
 internationalized 
urrency which was freely traded around the world. When Malaysia imposed capital and 
 
nd 
ill 
the mid 1990s, the monetary policy strategy had been based on targeting 
onetary aggregates. Monetary aggregates were closely linked to the ultimate objectives 
e 
e 
s, 
, 
A
Sterling. Following the collapse of the Sterling era in 1972, the Ringgit was pegged to th
US dollar before it was allowed to float in June 1973. However, in September 197
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) adopted a new exchange rate regime whereby the value of 
the Ringgit was determined in terms of a basket of representatives of major currencies
This regime lasted until July 1997, when BNM gave up managed the exchange rate in the 
wake of the Asian financial crisis. The Ringgit was allowed to float and values were 
determined by the market. With the imposed exchange control in September 2, 1998, the 
Ringgit was pegged to the US dollar at US$1.00=RM3.80. In July 2005, the Ringgit w
no longer pegged to the US dollar, but shifted to a managed float system. The objective 
of the managed float is to promote exchange rate stability against the currencies of 
Malaysia's major trading partners.  However, BNM stresses that the exchange rate is 
“market determined” as cited in its report, “the value of Ringgit to be determined by
economic fundamentals and market conditions” (BNM,2005).  But they have also 
articulated other objectives that are incompatible with clean floating, such as ironing o
excessive short-term volatility to prevent the exchange rate from becoming misalig
for a substantial period in order to ensure exchange rate stability(Ooi,2008). Exchange 
rate stability remains a key policy focus of BNM (Sukhdave, 2008).   
 
Prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Malaysian Ringgit was an
c
currency controls and fixed the value of the Ringgit at 3.8 to the US dollar, BNM decided
not to trade the Ringgit internationally. A traveler who takes out more than RM10,000 
out of the country needs to make a declaration to BNM. All payments/borrowings by 
residents to non-residents or non-residents to residents have to be in foreign currency, a
not in the Ringgit. The policy of non-internationalisation of the Ringgit reduces the 
ability of offshore entities to speculate on the Ringgit as shorting the Ringgit is not 
permitted (Sukhdave, 2008).  The fixed exchange rate was abandoned to a floating 
exchange rate in July 2005, but, BNM continues not to internationalize the Ringgit t
today.  
 
Prior to 
m
of the monetary policy.  The large capital inflows in the early 1990s highlighted th
problems associated with using monetary aggregates as policy targets (Latifah, 2002). 
Monetary aggregates became an unreliable indicator of price stability and BNM shifted 
its focus to interest rate targeting. In 2004, BNM executed its monetary policy 
responsibility by adjusting its policy interest rate – Overnight Policy Rate (OPR). OPR 
serves as the signal of the Bank's monetary policy stance. BNM does not use th
exchange rate as a monetary policy tool; instead the Bank through its liquidity operation
steer the average overnight interbank rate so that it is very close to the OPR (BNM
1999).  
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3.2 Managing the Impossible Trinity 
uring the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia was confronted with the problem of massive 
capital flight and a very large magnitude of depreciation of its currency.  The immediate 
 
a 
ht or 
y 
Since the economy recovered in 1999, there has been a gradual removal of some of the 
998 exchange control measures, both inflows and outflows, and for both residents and 
s 
re and 
e 
ith the gradual removal of the 1998’s capital control and an open capital account at a 
xed exchange rate, Malaysia once again, faced a conflict between a monetary policy and 
 
 
he fiscal 
e, 
 
D
reaction was to adopt the International Monetary Fund ‘s (IMF) prescription of increasing
interest rates to stem capital outflow. However, the move did not have the desired effect. 
As a consequence of the Impossible Trinity, Malaysia found that it was not possible to 
simultaneously control or manage the interest rate, the exchange rate and the flow of 
capital. The 1998’s capital controls provided leeway for a monetary policy, stabilized 
exchange rates and enhanced macroeconomic stability. By imposing capital controls, 
fixed exchange rate and making the Ringgit non-internationalisable in 1998, the 
government was able to handle the impossible trinity problem - it could now lower 
interest rates to stimulate the economy without having to worry about capital flig
currency volatility. In other words, Malaysia could conduct an independent monetar
policy with the aid of capital controls and the nonconvertible value of the Ringgit.  
 
1
non-residents. But the peg of the Ringgit to the US $ remained intact until July 2005. In 
fact, further major liberalization measures were announced after 2001. For example, the 
country re-instituted openness to capital flows by a further financial liberalization proces
guided by the Financial Sector Master plan and Capital Market Master plan, both 
launched in 2001.  Exit levy on portfolio foreign investments were abolished in 2001; 
residents were allowed to open foreign currency denominated accounts with onsho
offshore banks in 2008. One major aspect of the financial liberalization policy during th
post 97/98 crisis is the deregulation of capital outflows by residents as the main response 
to the surge in capital inflows in 2006 and 2007. This resulted in a big rise in direct 
investment outflows from Malaysia after 2006.  
 
 
W
fi
an exchange rate policy. When the capital account was closed, BNM could conduct its 
monetary policy and exchange rate policy independently of each other. However, the two 
are longer independent with the opening up of the capital account. The conflict between
domestic monetary policy and exchange rate policy arise when a country tries to keep its 
exchange rate fixed. Net inflows or out flows have to be absorbed by the central bank so 
that the exchange rate remains fixed. Reserves change in response to capital flows, hence,
a country loses its sovereignty with respect to the use of monetary policy for 
macroeconomic management. Masih (2005) noted that since monetary policy was 
directed to keep the exchange rate fixed, an enormous burden was placed on t
policy to achieve domestic objectives such as higher employment and higher incom
hence, resulting in a persistent fiscal deficit since 1998. This is the dilemma faced by 
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Malaysia after gradually removing the capital controls while still pegging the Ringgit  
with the US$. It was only until 21st July 2005 that BNM announced the removal of the
Ringgit peg in favor of a managed float regime. Malaysia has since then regained its 
monetary autonomy (Ariff, 2005).   
 
The Ringgit is now under “managed 
 
float” against a basket of undisclosed currencies, 
ith no fixed rate target. BNM has never revealed the composition of the basket or the 
ct, 
 
ince the removal of the Ringgit peg in 2005, the Ringgit has appreciated against the US$ 
by about 14%. The Ringgit moved from RM3.78/US$ in 2005 to RM3.30/US$ in 2007. 
t 
rs 
alaysia recognizes the potential risks of currency exposure and has 
instituted several measures to manage and mitigate such risks. Currency exposures are 
float and policy of non-internationalization of the Ringgit are key factors 
at allow Bank Negara Malaysia to set an interest rate policy based on domestic 
.3 Intermediate solutions 
rom the impossible trinity theorem is that once an economy is 
lly committed to increasing capital mobility, it cannot both fix its exchange rate and pursue 
ork in 
alaysia? Could it be that Malaysia has found a successful combination of compromises 
on the three aspects of the trinity? A managed float, in particular, one targeting an 
                                                
w
weights given to the various currencies in the basket. All this is by no means new, in fa
the current system, is no different from the one Malaysia had before the Asian Financial
Crisis, 1997/98. However, for this time around, there is no fixed rate target. Ariff (2005) 
noted that exchange rate targeting must be avoided. Ringgit was targeted at around 
RM2.50 per US dollar which led to the overvalue of the Ringgit, contributing to the 1997 
currency crisis.     
 
S
The deputy governor of BNM, Dato’Ooi Sang Kuang stated in his paper, “ no special 
measures have been introduced to deal with currency appreciation pressures over the pas
five years”(2008, p. 334). Nonetheless, like other developing countries, Malaysia prefe
some exchange rate stability rather than complete flexibility (Sukhdave,2008).   
As Ooi wrote: 
“Bank Negara M
monitored and foreign exchange gains or losses are revalued on a quarterly basis” 
(2008,p.335) 
 
The managed 
th
considerations.2
 
 
3
 
An important lesson learnt f
fu
an independent monetary policy. Any attempt to do so will eventually run into 
inconsistencies that will force the country to abandon one of its objectives.  
 
So how does Malaysia manage the three objectives?  Does a managed float w
M
 
2  BNM’s Monetary Stability Web Site, http://www.bnm.gov.my/microsites/monetary/index.htm 
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undisclosed currency basket is a less rigid exchange rate objective than a fixed ex
rate. Hence, there is a first ‘compromise’. Aside from this, in the case of Malaysia, 
currently, the managed float and the policy of non-internationalization of the Ringg
key factors that allow BNM to set an interest rate policy based on domestic 
considerations
change 
it are 
igure 
 of the figure, 
                                                
3.  Hence, Malaysia could conduct an independent monetary policy. F
2 is a simple schematic illustration of the intermediate regime in Malaysia. The 
liberalization of capital account has pushed Malaysia towards the lower part
the so-called “intermediate regime” by Frankel (1999).  
 
                          
Exchange Rate Stability
Increase 
capital mobility 
 
 
 
 
Managed float & non internalization of Ringgit Monetary autonomy 
Capital mobility
 
 
 
3  ibid 
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4. Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Malaysia   
A decade after the Asian crisis, Malaysia once again emerged as one of the fastest 
f 6.5% in 2007. Large current 
ccount surplus, high accumulation of reserves, low external debts, and low inflation 
indicate
 2007 and worsened in 
arly 2008, there had been little effect on Malaysia and in other Asian countries. But then 
the financial crisis began to affect the developed countries’ “real economy” of production 
ke Malaysia, namely, the finance channel and the trade channel 
(James et al, 2008). 
in 
estment turned into net capital outflows since the second quarter of 
008. In total, portfolio investments recorded the largest net outflow of RM92.4 billion in 
f capital liberalization in post 1997 was the considerable 
beralization of capital outflows in response to the strong capital inflows in 2006-2007 
hich built up reserves and pressure on the Ringgit.  This reversed policy can be 
 level 
he 
 
growing countries in Asia, expanding by an average o
a
 that Malaysia is entering a new period of robust growth with stability. As the 
Asian region steamed along, Malaysia once again, encountered massive capital inflows 
and rapid currency appreciation in 2006 and 2007 (BNM,2007).  
 
When the financial crisis began in the United States and Europe in
e
and incomes in the second half of 2008, and this has been increasingly transmitted to 
Malaysia towards the end of 2008 and early 2009 (Khor, 2008). The real GDP growth for 
the 4th quarter of 2008 was only 0.1% year-to-year increase as compared to 4.7% growth 
in the 3rd quarter of the same year, and the real GDP growth was negative 6.2% in the 
first quarter of 2009.  
There are two key channels through which the US financial crisis is transmitted to 
developing countries li
 
Net capital flows began to decline in Malaysia by the second quarter of 2008 as shown 
Table 1. Portfolio inv
2
2008, compared to a positive net inflow of RM18.355 billion in 2007.  Foreign direct 
investments into Malaysia plunged 95% from RM17.392 billion in the second quarter of 
2008 to RM0.881billion in the third quarter.  For the full year, foreign direct investments 
into Malaysia fell 9% in 2008.  
 
 
One of the important scenarios o
li
w
observed from the trend of Malaysia’s direct investment abroad/outward. There has been 
a sudden and dramatic jump in direct investment outward after 2006. In 2006, direct 
investment abroad by Malaysian companies had reached RM22.2 billion, the same
as FDI into Malaysia. In 2007, Malaysian investment abroad had risen further to RM37.9 
billion, which for the first time exceeded the FDI inflow of RM29.1 billion. In 2008, t
outflow jumped to RM47 billion in 2008, again exceeded the FDI inflow of RM26.7 
billion which resulted in a deficit of net FDI by RM20.5 billion. 
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Table 1: Financial Account in the Malaysia Balance of Payment, 2007 to 1st quarter 2009 
 2007 2008 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 
Financial 
Acc
-37.81 -123.90 26.45 -12.31 -61.48 -76.57 -29.76 
ount 
Direct 
t 
 
Investmen
-9.14 -20.50 -2.98 2.91 -18.97 -4.36   3.19 
  Abroad -38.22 -47.10 -6.33 -14.48 -19.5 6.43   0.435 
  In Malaysia        29.08   26.70 3.36 17.39 0.88 5.07   2.761
Portfolio 
Investment 
(net) 
18.36 -92.40 21.07 -24.02 -56.18 -33.27  -12.15 
Other 
Investment 
(net) 
-46.92  -11.00 7.56 8.84 13.79 -41.19   -20.79 
  Official Sector -5.79 -2.70 -0.71 1.61 -2.74 -0.86   -0.967 
  Private Sector -41.14  -8.30 8.28 7.24 16.53 -40.34   -19.832 
                  N his category covers financial transactions in trade credits, long and short term  
                  l t  are rded rect in nt, por m  reser
                  S  M Mo tistic tin  
bal crisis.  Data released by the Department 
f Statistics showed that Malaysia’s export which is highly dependent on electronics and 
miconductors, fell sharply since January 2009.  Besides the fall in manufactured 
have contracted by 32% to RM29.5 billion. The drop in 
xports has translated into a decline in imports as 70% of the country’s imports are in the 
ote: * t
oan and other transac ions that not reco under di vestme tfolio invest ent, and ve assets.  
ource: Bank Negara alaysia, nthly Sta s Bulle
 
 
The trade sector was also badly hit in this glo
o
se
exports, there is also seen a sudden drop in the demand and prices of export commodities 
such as palm oil in Malaysia 
 
While exports have declined, so has the import of intermediate goods associated with the 
exports.  Imports in Malaysia 
e
form of intermediate goods. Despite the decline in exports, Malaysia still maintains a 
trade surplus although these surpluses are smaller (see Figure 3).  
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F ig ure 3:  Malays ia's  external trade 
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5. Policy responses to the recent volatility in capital outflows 
 
 
How does Malaysia manage such reverse flows of capital and at the same time, 
maintain its exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy?  
 
Hannoun (2001) wrote that “if the choice of objectives relative to the impossible trinity is 
not clear, the policymaker has a wide range of policy options, but must make trade-offs 
…”  There are several ways in which BNM may respond to the challenges posed by large 
capital outflows: 1) use of international reserves for crisis mitigation, 2) allow the 
exchange rate to depreciate, 3) Intervene to resist exchange rate depreciate, 4) restrict 
capital outflows. 
 
 
5.1: International Reserves for crisis mitigation 
 
The amount of foreign reserves accumulated by Asian countries in recent years is huge. 
Many Asian countries that have suffered from the Asian currency crisis in 1997/98 
sharply increased their foreign reserves. Reserves accumulation accelerated after year 
2000.  
 
Asian countries began to accumulate huge reserves in the aftermath of the Asian 
Currency Crisis 1997. In 2006, among the top 10 reserves holding accumulating countries 
in the world, eight are Asian countries (Hashimoto, 2008).  
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Malaysia, like other Asian countries, built up huge reserves after the Asian Currency 
Crisis of 1997.  In 1998, the foreign reserves were about RM99 Billion (USD26 Billion), 
but increased to RM317.44 (USD 91.6) in 2008. This huge amount of reserves 
accumulation occurred in the past few years. Table 2 provides insight of the reserves 
buildup after 1997 which was mainly financed by current account surplus rather than 
through capital inflows. This sort of reserves, known as “earned reserves” refers to 
national reserves built up by a country resulting from the trade or current account surplus 
(Martin, 2008).  This sort of reserves is reliable and dependable and would be available 
when it is needed compared with reserves built through short term portfolio inflows or 
external borrowing.   
 
It is clearly shown from Table 2 that prior to 1997, accumulated reserves was not high in 
Malaysia. Although Malaysia received high inflows of capital, it was offset with a deficit 
in the current account, leaving little balance for the change in reserves. But after 1997, 
the depreciation of the Ringgit enhanced the international competitiveness of Malaysia’s 
exports. Strong current account surplus built up the national reserves to unprecedented 
levels despite a consecutive capital account deficit during this time period (except for a 
positive capital account balance recorded in 2004).   
 
There are pros and cons in holding a large amount of reserves.  The conventional view is 
that a large amount of reserves reflect strong economic fundamentals and is effective in 
preventing speculative pressures. On the other hand, the build up of reserves adds to 
quasi fiscal losses when the foreign interest rates earned are far lower than the interest 
paid on Malaysia’s debts. In addition, a country incurs capital loss if its domestic 
currency appreciates.  
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Table 2: Changes in Reserves, Current Account Balance, Capital Account Balance, 
Errors & Omissions, 1990 – 2008 (RM Billion) 
Year Accumulated 
Foreign 
Reserves 
Change in 
reserves 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Capital 
Account 
Balance 
Errors & 
Omissions 
1990 27.025 5.365 -2.483 4.829   3.019 
1991 30.452 3.427 -11.644 15.466 -0.395 
1992 47.195 16.744 -5.622 22.285   0.081 
1993 76.435 29.239 -7.926 22.795   9.370 
1994 68.172 -8.262 -14.77 3.175   3.333 
1995 63.769 -4.403 -21.647 19.140  -1.896 
1996 70.014   6.245 -11.226 11.642  -6.371 
1997 59.122 -10.892 -16.697  6.182 -0.377 
1998 99.424  40.301   37.394 -10.00 12.913 
1999 117.243 17.819   47.895 -25.152 -4.924 
2000 109.066  -8.176   32.252  -23.848 -16.580 
2001 113.585   4.518   27.687 -14.791  -8.378 
2002 128.181  14.595   30.494 -11.941  -3.958 
2003 167.962   39.781   50.624 -12.146    1.302 
2004 251.689   83.728   57.302   19.347    7.709 
2005 265.240   13.550   78.367  -36.991   -27.825 
2006 290.396   25.158   93.504  -43.488  -24.857 
2007 335.694   45.296 100.410  -37.805  -17.309 
2008 317.445 -18.250 129.935 -123.011  -25.174 
Source: Bank Negara Monthly Statistics Bulletin 
 
The strong international reserves position helps Malaysia weather the storm of capital 
flight and currency depreciation at the height of the global financial meltdown in late 
2008 and early 2009.  The reversal of the portfolio capital flows due to the repatriation 
activities by international foreign financial institutions following the deepening of the 
global financial crisis led to a decline in reserves in the second half of 2008.  
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5.2: Intervene to resist exchange rate depreciate 
 
Of course, we cannot rule out that one of the policy options for BNM is to intervene to 
resist exchange rate depreciation. This is a justified policy response under exceptional 
circumstances. Intervention (by selling foreign exchange) offers a means to resist 
exchange rate depreciation. But to avoid undermining domestic price stability, 
intervention needs to be sterilized. Sterilization can be costly and the cost can increase 
with the exhaust of the stock of reserves. Sukhdave (2008) points out three main factors 
in determining the successful intervention operations. Firstly, the availability of good 
information about the nature of capital flows and market conditions. BNM has several 
internal reporting systems to monitor capital account transactions, hence, facilitating its 
exchange rate management.  Secondly, the central bank must hold sufficient reserves to 
ensure successful intervention. Thirdly, a central bank must have enough instruments to 
manage the impact of its intervention operation on domestic liquidity conditions.  
 
Data on market interventions are not publicly available. Nonetheless, the direction of 
intervention can be inferred from the change in official exchange reserves. Figure 5 
shows unprecedented large scale selling of foreign reserves from July,2008 till February 
2009 as capital outflows intensified during this period.   
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Figure 5: Change in Reserves
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5.3: Allow the exchange rate to depreciate 
 
The preferred policy option for countries confronted with large capital outflows is to 
allow the exchange rate to depreciate. In principle, the flexibility of the exchange rate is a 
major adjustment mechanism for global trade and financial flows (Hannoun,2007). 
Currency should depreciate for countries that experience current account deficit and gross 
capital outflows. This will help to reduce future balance of payment deficits. 
Furthermore, a country can move away from reserve accumulation when exchange rates 
allow to adjust its value in the market. Figure 6 shows the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) of the Ringgit after January 2008. Figure 6 shows a downward trend of the 
REER since September 2008 following the tumble of the global stock market due to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US.    
 
Unlike during the Asian Currency Crisis, the decline in the value of the Ringgit has 
nothing to do with the fundamentals of the economy, rather it is due to declining demand 
in exports and capital outflows. The depreciation in the Ringgit may help to improve the 
export performance of the country, hence, limiting the negative impacts from the global 
recession. 
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Figure 6: Real Effective Exchange Rate
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5.4: Impose restrictions on capital outflows 
 
If the balance of payment deteriorates, one of the policy responses is to temporarily 
restrict capital outflows. Capital controls can be an option, but it has to be a  policy 
option of the last resort. Malaysia imposed such controls to stem the outflow of capital 
during the Asian currency crisis. Although the effectiveness of such controls remains a 
debate till today, these controls will enable Malaysian policy makers to buy time for the 
country to recover from the crisis. However, there are costs involved once capital control 
is introduced. Once a country resorts to control on capital, especially on capital outflows, 
investors will think that they might be introduced again in the future, which could deter 
further productive capital inflows.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Malaysia recovered from the Asian Currency Crisis and has made reasonably 
good progress since 1999. With the gradual removal of the 1998’s capital control and an 
open capital account at a fixed exchange rate, the country found that it was subjected to 
the “impossible trinity”, i.e. surrendering monetary autonomy at the expense of exchange 
rate stability and capital mobility.  It was only in July 2005 that Malaysia responded to 
this trilemma by adopting a managed float exchange rate with non internationalization of 
the Ringgit. This enabled policymakers to balance exchange rate stability with monetary 
autonomy at the opening up of the capital account.  
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But to manage all the three choices require intervention in the market and intervention 
has its costs. With increased financial integration, the trilemma is forcing most Asian 
countries to accept a somewhat less exchange rate stability or less monetary autonomy.  
This has become increasingly apparent in the case of Malaysia. In fact, the willingness by 
the BNM to allow a certain extent of exchange rate adjustment in the face of current 
global crisis reflects that Malaysia is not exempted from the impossible trinity. Perhaps 
the best choice to practise in future is to liberalize capital flows, maintain price stability 
and let the exchange rate float.  
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